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Tracing an outline of legal complexity 
 




Abstract Autopoiesis and systems theory are terms often treated as synonymous by lawyers.  
This sleight-of-phrase elides the space between autopoiesis and systems theory, removing its 
content.  Within this eliminated space there exist numerous understandings of systems 
approaches in law; one such understanding is complexity theory.  Complexity entails a very 
different systems view of law to that of autopoiesis.  In this paper I explore the concepts of 
complexity and their relevance to law.  In tracing an outline of complexity, a number of 
contradictions, paradoxes, and additional questions are exposed which require further detailed 
analysis in the future. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When lawyers talk about systems theory it is often assumed that they are talking about 
autopoiesis.  This is because advocates of that theory treat autopoiesis and systems theory as 
synonymous terms when they are not.  Legal autopoiesis is actually part of a wider set of 
ideas which can be grouped under the category of systems theory thinking.  By taking 
ownership of the term systems theory, proponents of legal autopoiesis pre-emptively confine 
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lawyers’ ideas about what a theory of systems could be about, and what view of the law a 
theory of systems should take.  This imposed bias excludes natural challengers to the 
autopoietic hegemony.  Complex systems theory is an umbrella concept which covers an 
array of alternative approaches to autopoietic systems thinking.  The purpose of this paper is 
to trace an outline of a complexity theory perspective on law, with a view to positioning 
complexity theory as an alternative to the autopoietic hegemony.  The literature on complex 
systems often amalgamates multiple elements of the range of these approaches and does not 
clearly acknowledge their origins within, or respective differences to, other similar systems 
approaches.  Notwithstanding this, I argue that complexity theory, and specifically the form 
of what I call legal complexity and outline here, offers a novel and different systems 
perspective on how lawyers might view law in society.  This novelty and difference is both in 
terms of offering a new conception of systems theory for law, and a different way of thinking 
about law in society. 
I draw on the work of Cilliers (Cilleirs 1998, 2000; Richardson, Cilliers and Lissack 
2001; Cilliers, Highlighen, Gershenson 2007) in my formulation of legal complexity.   His 
position recognises that knowledge is contingent, local, and limited, and that consequently it 
is impossible to offer any view as the singularly correct perspective (1998, viii, 113-114, 116-
117; 2001, 11).  Cilliers’ model of complexity is one of an interactive learning, remembering 
system (1998, 90 and 99), capable of selectively forgetting redundant information to make 
space for newer, more pertinent, knowledge (1998, 92).  The interacting parts of this 
construction suffer from their own locality, as well as their limited knowledge capacity and 
contestable perspective.  Additionally, all knowledge is distributed unevenly across the 
system, making it impossible for any one individual to access all the system’s information 
(1998, 95).  These postmodern ideas, particularly those relating to alternative perspectives on 
reality which Cilliers contributes to the complexity debate, take my formulation of legal 
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complexity in a different direction to that of others previously offered (for example Ruhl 
1996a, 1996b, 1997, 2008; Ruhl and Ruhl 1997; Ruhl and Salzman 2002, 2003; Webb 2005; 
and Murray 2006, 2008 discussed below), but I deploy a different framework; one more 
suitable to law (for Cilliers method of deployment see 1998, chapters 2-5).  In addition to 
these specific aspects of complex systems theory, Cilliers’ more general ideas relating to the 
central features of complexity theory are also used, for example self-organisation, adaptivity 
and anti-reductionism (1998, 4-5).  In complex systems, order emerges out of the quality of 
the interactions between parts, rather than the character of the parts themselves.  This 
contrasts with reductionism which is the methodological belief that an understanding of the 
whole can be gleaned from a summing of the results of an examination of the individual parts 
observed in isolation (1998, 1-2; 2007, 118-119).   
In order to support the claim that complexity theory offers a new perspective on law, I 
first comment on the systems approaches from which it can be distinguished; chaos theory 
and autopoiesis.  Both of these systems approaches have been deployed in law and bear 
similarities to complexity theory, and thus it is important to consider complexity theory’s 
treatment of them as well as clarifying their differences to it. I then give an overview of 
complexity theory and discuss the approach’s appearance in law to date.  Although I contend 
that complexity theory offers a different systems view of society which is capable of 
challenging the autopoietic hegemony, I do not directly compare the two here.  Instead I give 
an introduction to complexity theory as it relates to law.  This theory is of interest in its own 
right and should not be seen only in relative terms to autopoiesis; nevertheless, as autopoiesis 
is the dominant theory of systems in law some acknowledgement of it is appropriate.  
However, this does not mean that one should set out arguments for examining complexity 
theory further in the shadow of autopoiesis.  The purpose of this paper is to position 
complexity theory as an interesting approach for law in its own right.  The process of tracing 
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an outline is a contingent one.  The initial drawing together of the disparate ideas of 
complexity, as well as being only a general account, highlights a number of contradictions, 
paradoxes, and questions which will require further attention in future discussion.   
 
ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS APPROACHES TO COMPLEXITY THEORY 
Chaos theory is a theory of the natural sciences which has since spread to other 
disciplines and is a forerunner to complexity theory (Murray 2008, 238).  Chaos theory is 
most naturally discussed as a mathematical theory and when deployed in this sense it refers to 
deterministic chaos; which is the consequence of nonlinear mathematical equations which 
produce bounded unpredictability.  Nonlinear equations do not produce a single solution but 
yield a range of answers (Lorenz 1993, 14-15), and when plotted graphically the results show 
an intricate pattern which never repeats itself and also never strays outside of the possible 
range of answers (Ruhl 1996b, 862).  This plot represents the strange attractor, also known as 
the butterfly attractor, which shows that while the results appear random they will not stray 
outside certain limits; their disorder is not structureless (Lorenz 1993, 14-15).  Chaos theory 
as conceived of in law has carried over these central ideas, even when the mathematics was 
left behind (see for example Hayes 1992; Geu 1994).  This means that chaos theory tends to 
examine narrow systems of a relatively small number of nonlinearly interacting parts, 
whereas complexity theory examines large systems consisting of a great many interacting 
components (Cilliers 1998, ix).  Furthermore, chaotic systems self-organise largely based on 
the consequences of their mathematics, but complex systems do so on the basis of emergent 
behaviour generated out of interactions.  So while both are feature unpredictability, this is for 
different reasons.   
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Chaos theory’s place in the popular consciousness (Lorenz 1993, 181-184; Cilliers 
1998, ix) has made it possible for its ideas to infiltrate theories which appear similar or 
related in nature, such as complexity, creating the potential for misunderstanding.  This 
situation is not helped by the fact that the same (though not in the sense of equivalent 
meaning) terminology is used to describe a different view of the world in the respective 
theories (Lorenz 1993, 3-5).  These differences are often minimised, unacknowledged, or lost 
altogether when the ideas are transposed across disciplines (Cilliers 2000, 26), and this may 
explain why chaos and complexity theories, which are separate theories, are often conflated.  
To add further confusion, while chaos theory is a distinct theory of systems it is connected to 
complexity theory in that it was a forerunner to it, and consequently aspects of the theory 
have found “extremely limited” (Cilliers 1998, ix) application in the later approach.  
Attractors are an example of a chaos theory device which has been adopted by complexity 
theory (see infra pages 23-24).  However, alternative understandings of the familial 
relationship between chaos and complexity theories have led to the former being treated as a 
narrow sub-category of the latter (Castellani et al. 2009, 119).  Nevertheless, some of the 
literature recognises a difference between chaos and complexity theories, even if this 
acknowledgement is sometimes only implied (Cilliers 1998, ix and 98).  Furthermore, the 
relationship between chaos and complexity is nuanced making the precise classification of, 
and demarcation between, each dependent on the context in which they are employed.  
Regardless of the similarities between chaos and complexity theories, I suggest that chaos 
theory is unable to offer a sufficiently detailed (and thus useful) systems theory explanation 
of law, given its tendency towards narrow examination of small-scale systems, with very few 
parts or participants.  Conversely, complexity theory, supplemented by narrow aspects of 
chaos theory, is capable of offering a detailed understanding of large systems, such as the 
legal system, consisting of many participants.   
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The theory of autopoiesis also has scientific roots.  However, whereas chaotic systems 
are based on mathematics, autopoiesis was originally a biological theory (see for example 
Maturana et al. 1980).  Autopoiesis is a theory concerned not with nonlinearity, as in chaos, 
but instead with understanding social complexity.  Comprehensive introductions to 
autopoiesis have been provided by others (including King 2009; Mingers 1995; and Teubner 
1988, 1993); here, I summarise the theory’s essential elements.  Autopoiesis views society as 
being made up of many functionally differentiated, operationally closed, cognitively open 
subsystems (law, politics, economics, health etc.).  In autopoiesis law’s function is to 
maintain “counterfactual [normative] expectations” (Luhmann 1992, 1426), it is supposed to 
provide answers (and expectations) about the legality or illegality of action (or prospective 
action), but it is not required to change when the facts (the event) does not meet with 
expectations (the legal requirements).  The legal system performs a “consistency check” on 
the encountered facts against its expectations and determines the status of an action 
(Luhmann 1988b, 337; and 1989. 140) by applying its functional binary code of legal/illegal 
(King 1993, 223).  As a consequence of closure, all communications not of a legal nature are 
outside of the system and so beyond the operations of it (King 1993, 223).  Autopoiesis 
constructs everything internally; there are “no exchange relationships” with other systems 
(Luhmann 1988b, 337).  Law can only imagine (by constructing an environment for itself) 
what another system might be thinking (King et al 1994, 263; and see Luhmann, 1988a).  The 
closest a system comes to connecting with another system is through structural coupling , and 
even this mechanism only allows systems to connect indirectly and develop along parallel 
lines when they each have an interest in the same social event (King 1993, 225).  Structural 
coupling is an entirely internal process within each system, with systems unable to see or 
access the coupling (Mingers 1995, 147).  They only experience a channelling of information 
about events that it brings (Luhmann 1992, 1432). 
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There has been interest in autopoiesis in some domains of legal scholarship, but this 
has been limited and, in reality, the pattern is “of wide indifference and locally intense 
engagement” (Thornhill 2010, 380).  In contrast, other disciplines which have taken an 
interest in complexity theory, have subsumed autopoiesis under the heading of complexity 
theory, (Castellani et al. 2009, 171-179) limiting its application and giving it only “a very 
specific meaning.” (Castellani et al. 2009, 127)  Others, while positioning legal autopoiesis 
within a chaos/complexity discourse (Ruhl 1996b, note 10, 857), paint it as being mistaken, 
(Ruhl 1996b, 904-906) and as a misunderstanding (Walby 2007, 457), “a sort of hybrid 
between complexity theory and legal formalism, [which] falls short of each in terms of 
explaining anything” (Ruhl 1996b, note 150 902).  Autopoiesis projects an alternative ethos 
to complexity; their apparent similarities in terms of the tools used mask deeper differences in 
their outlook.  It is, however, inappropriate to subsume autopoiesis under complexity (or vice 
versa) as each brings different ideas to bear on social phenomena.  Consequently it is hard to 
state that either is better than the other and my purpose here is to demonstrate the alternative 
perspective offered by complexity theory. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF COMPLEXITY THEORY 
Complexity theory, originating in physics and bio-chemistry in North America during 
the 1970s and 1980s (for history see Lewin 1992; Waldrop 1994) is a species of open systems 
theory.  It has subsequently been developed in a number of disciplines beyond the natural 
sciences (for examples see Castellani and Hafferty, 2009; Cilliers, 1998, 2000; Geyer and 
Rihani. 2010; Mitleton-Kelly, 2003; Rescher, 1998; Sawyer, 2005; Walby 2007).  
Complexity’s openness means that a system’s internal organisation does not respond to one 
specific category of environmental stimuli, but is capable of selectively interacting with all in 
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its environment.  The system itself decides what information it will interact with and what 
meaning it will assign to it.  A complex system is an adaptive, learning system; its 
understanding of the environment is changeable in the light of interactions and received 
information.  Due to its capacity to learn, a complex system is capable of resisting change; it 
can make decisions as to whether to react to environmental stimuli.  This decision could be 
based, but not necessarily, on whether it understands the information.  Whilst a complex 
system is open this does not mean that everything affects it equally, that the system is not in 
control to some extent, or that “anything goes” (Cilliers 1998, viii, emphasis added).  
Complex systems are constituted out of a large number of relatively homogenous parts acting 
in accordance with a set of rules.  System parts interact under these rules and from this 
system behaviour and organisation emerges.  Importantly, the form of system organisation 
and behaviour cannot be predicted by examining the constituent parts, and the particular 
development of the system cannot be predicted from an observation of its starting point.  
Finally, the homogenous interacting parts of complex systems, in the case of human social 
systems, are people.  However, as discussed below, all knowledge and information within the 
environment is, as well as being distributed unevenly across the environment (Cilliers 1998, 
95), contingent, contestable, and incomplete (Richardson et al. 2001, 10-11). 
These characteristic traits of complex systems emerge out of a number of features and 
devices.  However, as legal autopoiesis confines debate about systems theory in law it is 
important that any given understanding of legal complexity does not do the same.  The 
features and devices discussed here thus represent the outline of one position, in truth “there 
are an infinite number of ways to talk about complexity” (Richardson et al. 2001, 11).  Ruhl, 
for example, offers an alternative characterisation of legal complexity which is discussed 
below (Ruhl 2008).  Moreover, attempts to demarcate correct or incorrect classifications of 
complexity are, as will become clear, “contradictory to the fundamental complexity message” 
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(Richardson et al. 2001, 12).  It is therefore relatively easy to justify an abandonment of 
elements of complexity theory used in other disciplines, including the mathematical rigour, 
the preference for computer modelling, and the reliance on data sets, as inappropriate for a 
general theory of legal complexity (however see Castellani et al. 2009, 121).  Legal theory 
has tended not to rely on such practices preferring a philosophical method of constructing 
theories based on the opinions and observations of a given writer, and therefore the 
application of complexity theory to law need not draw on the methods of other disciplines; 
this is demonstrated by the deployment of complexity in law so far. 
 
COMPLEXITY THEORY’S APPEARANCE IN LAW 
The most well-developed vision of law and complexity has been offered by Ruhl 
(1996a, 1996b, 1997, 2008; Ruhl and Ruhl 1997; Ruhl and Salzman 2002, 2003), and his 
work has contributed to the appearance of complexity theory and law in the UK (see Murray 
2008, 238-242).
1
  Much of Ruhl’s work draws on the chaos theory and law literature (see his 
various references to Geu 1994), and on chaos theory literature more generally.  This is 
evident in his ‘science of surprises’ (first deployed in 1996a, 1438) which is based around 
ideas of chaos, emergence and catastrophe.  Ruhl also makes use of attractors, transferring 
the idea directly from chaos theory into complexity (first deployed in 1996a, 1440-42; see 
also 1996b, 863-865); indeed, his references to weather patterns and dripping taps suggests a 
relationship to the fractal geometry of chaos theory which is absent in complexity (1997, 
936).  However, there are also references to “irreversibility” (Ruhl and Ruhl 1997, 409-410) 
and “feedback” (Ruhl and Salzman 2003, 808); concepts which can be found in either chaos 
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or complexity theory.  Also present are the more familiar complexity notions of limited local 
knowledge of individual actors (1996a, 1450-1451) and a clear rejection of reductionism 
(1996b, 853).  Ruhl departs from pure mathematical chaos theory given the references to 
‘complex adaptive systems’ distributed throughout his work, and the content of his latest 
exposition of these ideas (2008, 896-901. 904,906).  In essence Ruhl’s work is situated in 
complexity but its foundations appear to have been constructed in chaos and law.  This is 
most likely due to the absence of any available literature on law and complexity prior to 
Ruhl’s work. 
Ruhl implies that humans can overcome their limited knowledge to shape some 
aspects of the legal system through their intervention in the rule- (law-) creating process 
(1996b, 885-886).  He does not go so far as to say that humans can control complex systems 
but an awareness of how complex systems function, particularly an awareness of which 
attractors they are currently built around, can aid the law-making process to possibly avoid 
some potential pitfalls generated out of the unknown variables of the system, and the inherent 
unpredictability of the consequences of system interactions (1996b, 926-928).  Ruhl’s more 
recent focus is on regulatory efforts in environmental law and he uses complexity theory as a 
means to explain regulatory failings and routes to potentially more effective regulation (Ruhl 
1997; Ruhl and Ruhl 1997; Ruhl and Salzman 2002, 2003).  More generally, he sees 
complexity as offering a theory capable of explaining the processes of legal development and 
stagnation (Ruhl 1996a, 1996b, 2008). 
Following and drawing upon Ruhl, Murray constructs a novel vision of complexity 
theory which primarily utilises Deleuze and Guattari’s work on chaos and complexity 
theories (Murray 2006, 2010).  In this respect, Murray bases his understanding of chaos 
theory on different premises.  Rather than focusing on the general idea of complexity as Ruhl 
does, Murray is more concerned with the processes by which complex organisations emerge 
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and are maintained.  The product of this is termed emergent law and seeks to explain how the 
state may have originally appeared (2006, 150).  Emergent law is concerned with the self-
organising emergence of systems from chaos, taking place “in open and dynamic material 
dissipative systems” (2006, 132), this is the process by which complex systems emerge.  
Instead of models and boundaries, the system is described by “abstract machines” which 
“define the patterns and thresholds” of, and “diagram and arrange,” the system (2006, 132-
133).  Through these abstract “machinic processes” complex systems are able “to learn, 
evolve, and under-go metamorphosis as they seek to maintain a dissipative structure as their 
environment changes” (2008, 236).  However, instead of “systems” the theory is based 
around DeLanda’s “assemblages” (DeLanda, 2006), where the “virtual activities of the 
abstract machines are developed in intensive complexity” (2006, 132-133).  Within these 
virtual spaces abstract machines build imaginary realities of the environment which find their 
way to “the actual” (2006, 133).  This provides a useful explanatory link of how complex 
systems’ models of reality find their way from the imagined model to the actual reality (2006, 
138).  The same can be said of the additional device of “the refrain” which allows “a brain to 
abstract itself from the here and now and think in terms of a dynamic consistency between a 
number of heterogeneous matters of expression” (2006, 138). Assemblages lay down territory 
as they self-organise; they self-organise their own territorial limits (2006, 142).  However, 
they simultaneously lose other territory as the environment shifts around them; this is the 
process of territorialisation and deterritorialisation (2006, 133-134). 
Murray’s alternative construction of complexity still contains certain recurring 
features of complexity such as emergentism, as noted above, and anti-reductionism.  
Murray’s anti-reductionism manifests as a fairly withering and sustained attack on 
autopoiesis, with complexity portrayed as a “significant advance” (2008, 228) on autopoiesis’ 
position.  Autopoiesis is suggested to have incorrectly narrowed and limited the complexity 
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of the social world, whereas complexity offers “a much broader theorisation” (2008, 234).  
Demonstrating further acceptance of emergentism and the principle of irreversibility, 
Murray’s formulation of emergent law seeks out different understandings of law in the form 
of “lost, hidden, local, bottom-up, emergent modes of legality” (2008, 243-245), seeing them 
as being part of “an irreversible historical trajectory that is pushed, pulled, and reshaped by a 
large number of competing and changing socio-legal attractors” (2008, 240).  Law is a 
contested space, not all of which is visible to the actors present in the legal system.  It is a 
dynamic system constantly being changed by both its own processes and the processes of 
forces beyond it.  Murray criticises autopoiesis’ operational coding for eliminating or at least 
suppressing the dynamic quality of complex systems, placing the system closer and closer to 
equilibrium which for a complex system would mean entropy (death) (2008, 234-235).  
Murray’s examination of law’s complexity appears more as an exercise to understand the 
processes which caused law to emerge and get to this point.  This indirectly offers an 
explanation for how law continues to change, but Murray does not offer examples of how his 
emergent law relates to any concrete circumstances in the way that Ruhl connects his 
construction to environmental regulation. 
Webb combines Cilliers’ postmodern account of complexity with autopoietic 
undertones to produce his vision of complexity and law.  However, the systems-image 
created is not an autopoietic one in the “conventional” sense (2005, 240); nevertheless, his 
model comes closer to adopting notions from the more developed theory of autopoiesis into 
the fledgling theory of complexity and law.  Indeed, Webb understands autopoiesis as a 
“significant branch of complexity theory” (2005, 227 at note 3), but he appears to treat the 
ideas of Luhmann and Teubner as separate to those of Cilliers (Webb 2005, 229-231; but see 
autopoietic influence 231-234).  It also needs to be noted that Webb’s use of Cilliers, given 
the lean towards autopoiesis, entails a different deployment to the reading of Cilliers traced in 
13 
 
this paper.  However, neither the (possible) autopoietic inspiration nor the different 
deployment of theoretical structures is reason to set aside the product.  As Webb writes, there 
is an “absence of a unifying theory…” leading to “a lack of common language and some 
significant local differences of approach” in complexity thinking (2005, 232).  There is no 
lexicon of complexity (Richardson et al. 2001, 11), and the very nature of complexity theory 
expects a differentiated approach across reality. 
Webb ascribes to complexity the tenets of unpredictable emergent order and 
irreversibility (2005, 229), and also follows Cilliers on the limitations of the localised, 
contingent perspectives of any given observer, and the existence of memory and learning in 
systems (2005, 231 and 235).  Again, the system is built out of many interactions (2005, 232) 
but, and this is the most obvious entry of autopoiesis into this conception of law and 
complexity, the maintenance of boundaries seems to be conducted internally by the system 
which seeks to maintain itself independently from the environment (2005, 233).  However, 
the gift of complexity, which is perhaps not to be found in autopoietic conceptions is that it 
gives “an insight into the local, the unplanned and unintended, the order that emerges at the 
edge of chaos” (2005, 231).  Complexity, in Webb’s understanding, offers a framework for 
explaining the unpredictable and emergent occurrences of the legal system.  In treating 
autopoiesis as an aspect of complexity, rather than as an alien theory, Webb is able to draw 
on the foundational ideas of that method, while integrating the broader complexity principles 
offered by Cilliers.  This changes entirely the consequences of his autopoietic inferences.  
Although he draws on autopoietic coding and the idea of the functional differentiation of 
society (2005, 233) he projects a system image of something like autopoiesis but not as we 
know it.  The addition of a memory and learning capacity in a complexity sense, rather than 
the traditional legal autopoiesis understanding, represents an attempt to overcome some of the 
perceived shortcomings of autopoiesis without wholly subsuming it under complexity. 
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Perhaps the most important distinction to make between autopoiesis and Webb’s 
approach to law and complexity is the re-appearance of the individual.  Significantly, the 
individual is empowered or at least imbued with a responsibility for their actions.  While all 
knowledge is local and limited, the unpredictability of interactions which people have with 
one another means that they could have a very large impact on reality; because there is a non-
linear relationship between cause and effect.  While the individual actor could be portrayed as 
a mere cog in the system, or indeed relegated to the level of psychic systems by autopoiesis, 
here complexity accords the individual the opportunity for impact.  In line with the idea that 
systems theory does not promote any particular value system, Webb suggests that values in 
complex systems are neither transcendent or immanent but instead emergent (2005, 239). The 
system does not treat the empowerment of the individual as either a “good” or “bad” thing, 
but rather as simply an emergent consequence of system processes.  Values in the system 
emerge from the interactions of the components of the system and continue to exist so long as 
they aid the perpetuation of that system (2005, 239).  Democracy, or something like it, is 
likely to continue because of the way it enables interaction among the component parts of the 
system in a way which is richer and less constrained than in any dictatorial environment.  
Ultimately it should be remembered that the values themselves are contingent and their 
meaning open to contestation, so the perpetuation of these ideas broadly speaking may not be 
entirely desirable, depending on the persuasions of the system. 
Webb’s contribution to the debate about systems theory thinking in law is certainly 
the idea that aspects of different systems theories can be combined.  This changes the 
character of those theories, but this is not necessarily a flaw.  Generally problems with 
autopoietic systems accounts seem to be concerned with its elimination of the individual 
(Bankowski 1996), or issues surrounding its particular method of dividing and running 
society (see King 2001 for a summary of critical efforts).  It does not seem to be an issue of 
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the idea of systemic organisation which is a problem for lawyers, but the particular method 
offered by autopoiesis.  Thus, if it is possible to construct alternative systems based 
formulations which take account of these concerns, which Webb demonstrates complexity 
has the potential to do, a systems view may have success.  I thus now outline another version 
of complexity theory to those set out above; a version which is designed to offer a viable 
alternative systems approach to autopoiesis. 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION OF LEGAL COMPLEXITY 
It is important to recognise that any classification of the features and devices of complexity is 
“provisional and definitely local” (Ricardson et al. 2001, 12).  Complexity theory “…is a set 
of theoretical and conceptual tools; not a single theory to be adopted holistically” (Walby 
2007, 456).  To avoid confusion arising as a consequence of the selection of particular tools, 
theorists should be explicit about which elements of complexity are being adopted, how they 
are received, and what informs that choice.  To that end, a brief summary of the features and 
devices of legal complexity as outlined here is given below; self-organisation and emergence, 
internal models, path-dependency and evolution, contingency, contestability and locality, and 
attractors.  These features and devices are grouped together as they relate to the inside (the 
system), the boundary (between system and environment), the outside (the environment) and 
the whole (relating to processes linking inside, boundary and outside). 
 
INSIDE THE SYSTEM 
A complex system is a self-organising system wherein organisation is seen to 
spontaneously emerge from disordered chaos (Cilliers et al 2007, 126; Waldrop 1994, 124).  
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The system must orientate itself towards the environment with incomplete information, and 
an awareness that the knowledge it does possess is both local and contingent (Richardson et 
al. 2001, 10-11).  To the imaginary outside observer, as to the system, the order which 
appears from disorder cannot be predicted from a reductionist examination of the system 
components.  The observer is called imaginary because of the impossibility of an observer 
concurrently holding two contradictorily contingent perspectives.  That is the impossibility of 
an observer achieving a vantage point beyond the system whilst simultaneously viewing the 
system from the system’s own perspective).  Self-organisation is an emergent quality of 
complex systems entailing a transcendence of their constituent ingredients (Urry 2003, 13; 
for discussion of emergence see Goldstein, 2000; and Holland, 1998).  Thus, order emerges 
from the nature of the interactions of the parts of the system and not of the parts themselves 
(Mitleton-Kelly 2003, 40).  As such, organisation is the product of many local decisions; 
there is no central hub which controls the organisation of the system.  Control is distributed 
throughout the interacting parts (Cilliers 1998, 12).   
Although the system obeys certain simple environmental rules, (particularly the 
physical limitations on a system, as well as the linguistic limitations of the interactors) which 
constrain the interactions of the component parts (Geyer et al. 2010, 6; Ruhl 2008, 892), the 
accessibility (knowability) and utility of these rules, as well as their apparent simplicity, are 
questionable in human complex systems.  Any list of these simple rules is probably 
“nonfinite” (Ruhl 1996b, 854).  It is perhaps most appropriate to consider these rules as 
existing hypothetically, but as also not being capable of specification.  The result of any 
attempt to note down the rules would be legitimately contestable.  Nonetheless, 
acknowledging the presence of constraining rules, the form the system takes is not 
predictable; the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Geyer, et al. 2010, 15).  What can 
be said in a general sense is that micro-level interactions produce meta-level regularities (see 
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Sawyer 2005, 3; Ruhl 2008, 898; Cilliers 1998, 92).  It is the interaction of the system 
components within the constraints of their reality which causes self-organised behaviours to 
emerge.  It is important to stipulate that although the micro- and meta-levels exist 
simultaneously, they do not appear reducible; they cannot be isolated from one another. 
The legal system can be understood as a complex self-organising system.  The 
character of the legal system cannot be discerned simply by learning every case and statute 
on the books, nor can the form into which it will develop at any point in the future be 
predicted by such methods.  One must understand the context of law inasmuch as that 
possible.  Even if one could know the context of every case and statute, which one cannot 
(Rescher 1998, xiv-xv), knowledge of the legal system would still be limited by one’s local 
context, interplaying with the respective contexts which one may be trying to address.  In this 
way it is never possible for any given participant in the system to be aware of even a fraction 
of the total complexity of the system (J. Webb 2005, 235; and see Cilliers 1998, 95).  Acting 
on incomplete, contingent, local knowledge, participants interact with the mechanisms and 
models of understanding of the legal system (such as the courts and administrative agencies) 
(see infra 9-12), which generate decisions, and with one another, changing the organisation of 
the system.  Collections of local interactions lead to the development of emergent meta-level 
principles of the legal system, such as human rights.  However, the legal system also 
demonstrates how the micro- and meta-levels are inseparable as interpretations of the meta-
level are contested at the micro-level.  The controversy over the existence, scope, and 
meaning of the right to life (and death) and the meaning of inhumane and degrading 
treatment are prime examples of this.   
As a consequence of the inaccessibility of total reality, even the development of 
relatively confined aspects of the legal system cannot be predicted.  It is not possible to say 
how many individuals’ models of understanding will interact and develop.  While  a solicitor 
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giving generalised legal advice to a client may be able to predict the outcome of simple cases, 
such as traffic offences which often appear as a question of fact rather than opinion (was the 
driver breaking the speed limit? Was the driver’s blood-alcohol level above the legal limit?), 
it will be less possible to determine the sentence which will be passed in a given case due to 
various mitigating and other circumstances particular to it.  Beyond this, it is certainly not 
possible to predict how hundreds of cases, even simple ones, heard over time will alter the 
justice system, public perceptions of law, legislative action, the prison population and so on.  
It is in turn not possible to predict how any other non-legal matters (such as the changing 
cultural attitudes towards alcohol consumption, the increasing effectiveness of automated 
vehicle safety technology, or improved surgical techniques for traumas sustained in traffic 
collisions) connected with these issues will impact on the development of the law, or the 
outcome in any given case.  What is more, events which appear completely disconnected 
from others, indeed utterly irrelevant, may still have a legal impact.  These need not even 
affect the decision makers directly; and could be less proximate than what a judge had for 
breakfast.  Most importantly, it is not possible to see how each of these responses to the 
development of road traffic law will reflect back on its development.  This may seem an 
obvious proposition but complexity offers an explanation for why this is the case. 
The unpredictability of legal development is due to both the emergent nature of such 
development coupled with the idea that there need not be a connection between the 
occurrence or size of any cause (though it might only appear as a cause in hindsight) and the 
resultant effect; the relationship between cause and effect is nonlinear (Waldrop 1994, 142).  
Furthermore, any decision of the system, borne out of its local interactions, may be based on 
seemingly irrelevant considerations.  The information of relevance to the model is not 
unchanging but dynamic and interfaced with considerations which are not obviously legal.  A 
case which is the correct view of the law today may not be so tomorrow and the model must 
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therefore be adaptive.  Perspectives as to the correct or incorrect view remain contestable.  A 
court judgment as to the correct position denotes the meta-level regularities as perceived by 
the judge, and argued by the advocates, at that time.  This can, of course, be contested by 
other judges, advocates, clients, academics, legislators, officials, journalists; indeed, anyone.  
These divergent understandings of the meta-level regularities represent the contestation of the 
meta-level at the micro-level, in turn generating newly adapted regularities.  It is through the 
contestation of meta-level regularities at the micro-level that the system self-organises its 
internal composition out of a disordered chaos of interactions.  Information that builds the 
meta-level organisational regularities of the system is incomplete and contestable.  Meta and 
micro are constantly contested causing the system to re-self-organise in the light of changing 
circumstances.  In this way the system learns and adapts to change in an attempt to secure its 
survivability. 
 
THE BOUNDARY OF THE SYSTEM 
The way in which a system, open or closed, possesses a boundary is complicated and 
merits deeper investigation beyond the remit of this paper.  Thus, my discussion is only a 
tracing of the concept.  In one sense there exists the actual system boundary, inasmuch as 
boundaries can be said to exist at all on a complexity view of the world (Richardson et al. 
2001, 9).  Indeed, it might be more appropriate to view the world as one complex system and 
any demarcation of it as merely a “partial complex system” missing out some of reality 
(Richardson et al. 2001, 9).  Beyond this, there are at least two meanings of “boundary” in 
complexity’s understanding.  First, the boundary of what we might more commonly identify 
as a (partial) “system,” like the legal system. The boundary in this understanding, if it exists, 
is objectively unobservable due to the contingent nature of complex systems.  The second 
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meaning is the observed boundary of the (partial) system.  In drawing the boundary from a 
perspective limited by context, the observer eliminates some of the complexity of the reality 
under observation.  This understanding brings into sharp relief the contingency of boundaries.  
Often, for the purposes of analysis, an observer will deliberately draw a boundary, knowingly 
omitting some part of the (partial) system reality under observation (Richardson 2004a, 77).  
The following explanation primarily focuses on these two understandings of boundary. 
Complex systems are open systems and, as such, their boundaries “are not clearly 
defined” (Cilliers 2000, 25).  Not only are they not permanent or knowable to the individual, 
but their contestable nature within the system renders them transient (Richardson et al. 2001, 
9).  However, the system does not randomly (i.e. in a non-deterministic chaotic sense) alter 
its organisation or boundaries in response to all stimuli, nor does it respond equally to all 
effective stimuli.  The system produces models of reality which “allow [it] to anticipate the 
world,” and respond (Waldrop 1994, 177; see original idea in Holland 1995, 31-34).  Such 
models provide an individual, at the micro-level, or a system, at the meta-level, with a means 
of making sense of environmental information, to decide whether information is pertinent, 
and thus whether it should be classified as “legal” (in the case of the legal system).  This 
allows the system to then adapt both its organisational rules and structure in the light of such 
decisions on information.  The system is therefore defined, at the boundary, by what is 
considered legal, even though the meaning of “legal” is unfixed and indeterminate.  The 
boundary is contingent and remains unclear.  Complex systems are capable of such 
reconfigurations because they possess both a learning capacity and a memory (Cilliers 1998, 
90 and 99).  The boundary of the system is therefore flexible and capable of changing 
according to the regularities which emerge at the meta-level of the system.   
A complex system’s memory is not infinite; internal and external resources are 
limited (J. Webb 2005, 236) thus, the memory of legal complexity is contained within the 
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participants in the legal system.  While information might be recorded in casebooks and 
journals, individuals must have access to that information for it to count for anything and 
contribute to boundary making.  The mere existence of some legal communication is not 
sufficient.  To cope with the limits of its memory the system perpetually undergoes a process 
of “selective forgetting”; that which “is not used simply fades away” freeing up space 
(Cilliers 1998, 92) and this alters the boundary.  Conversely, that which is used often is 
harder to forget (Cilliers 1998, 92).  For the legal system, one model for understanding reality 
could be represented by the body of precedents and legislation which have accumulated over 
the system’s history; some of these cases and statutes have been forgotten as others have 
appeared and achieved seminal status (J. Webb 2005, 235).  The meaning of this body of 
information is contestable. 
The (in)accessibility of information is a consequence of information’s localised 
nature.  Just as information within the environment is localised, and so may not be accessible 
to the system, the same is true of the information stored within models of understanding.  All 
information is stored in a “distributed fashion,” (J. Webb 2005, 235; and see Cilliers 1998, 
95) so different knowledge exists in different parts of the system.  Though all this information 
might be characterised as legal, it will not always contribute to boundary construction.  Partly 
because of the way knowledge about the models is stored (in individuals) and partly because 
of the inherent contingency of that knowledge (and the contingent, subjective nature of 
meaning-making) (J. Webb 2005, note 19, 231), the understandings provided by the models 
are themselves contestable (Cilliers 1998, 122).  Broad propositions (meta-regularities) are 
predominantly accepted as true, such as “legislation is law” and “case law is law”, whereas 
more specific meta-level conclusions may not be.  For example, a case may not be cited 
either because it (the meta-level regularity) is locally inaccessible or because it is interpreted 
as not enhancing the argument of the particular advocate at a particular time or place.  
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Essentially, meta-level regularities can be localised and suffer from their localism by not 
contributing to a particular boundary construction.  Similarly, arguments between advocates, 
and the conflicting opinions of judges, demonstrate that the meaning of cases and statutes is 
contestable.  Incidentally, this is an example of the simultaneous formation and contestation 
of meta-level regularities at the micro- and meta-levels respectively.  This is an ongoing 
argument about what the law means and thus what is and is not within the legal system. 
The sheer volume of literature currently available on any given subject renders 
“comprehensive knowledge effectively unattainable” (Rescher 1998, xiv-xv) we are all 
perpetually “in ‘the shadow of the whole” (Richardson 2004a, 77).  So while a capacity to 
learn allows the legal system to change, its limited memory (the memory of system 
participants manifested in their models), the locality and contingency of knowledge, and the 
innate imperfections of its models (themselves contingent and local whether they are at the 
micro- or meta- level) makes perfect prediction of the consequences of information (and 
action taken on the basis of information) impossible, even discounting the problems posed by 
nonlinearity.  This opens up the possibility of the system making mistakes in the sense that 
system stability is affected, and not in the normative sense of being morally “wrong” choices 
(on values in complex systems see J. Webb 2002, 2005; see also infra 12-15).  As such, 
complexity theory generally, and the internal models of complex systems specifically, cannot 
describe the totality of the complexity, i.e. reality, of the system or its environment (Cilliers 
2000, 28), rendering even (potentially) partial boundaries contestable. 
 
BEYOND THE SYSTEM: THE EXTERNAL 
Theories of systems view the world as being comprised of a variety of systems 
occupying an environment.  Due to their somewhat open nature, a differentiation between 
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system and environment is difficult in complex systems.  However there are, beyond the 
system, phenomena which contribute to the overall structure of the complex environment.  
We might call these environmental meta-regularities.  In the case of legal complexity these 
can be more succinctly termed attractors.  Attractors are a familiar concept in chaos theory 
and come in three ‘flavours’: fixed-point, limit-cycle and strange (Ruhl 1996b, 863-864).  In 
the context of complexity theory, as presented here, the term attractor is used to describe a 
point of attraction towards which systems flow.  Although attractors themselves do not exert 
a “gravitational force” per se (Ruhl 1996a, note 137 1440), they do “deform the possibility 
space [of reality]…from above” (Goldstein 2000, 16). 
Whether an attractor exists is contestable and they are best employed as a descriptive 
device to explain why particular social influences and structures (characterised as attractors) 
are dominant over others in some societies (i.e. democracy over feudalism, capitalism over 
communism, and the rule of law over arbitrary dictatorship).  In this way, attractors are a 
dynamic representation of the changing environment (Ruhl and Salzman 2003; Urry 2003, 
138-139).  They can be characterised as representational of the forces leading to meta-level 
regularities of the environment, as opposed to regularities in the system.  Where certain 
values are ascendant, like those noted above, with long lineages, some explanation for this 
stability is offered by attractors.  The analysis offered by any explanation (observation) 
utilising attractors can only be one contestable analysis, with others probably possible.  This 
is because any observation will view the purpose and capacity of attractors differently.  
Differing observations may choose to ignore certain attractors, making the outcome different. 
Due to their nature as descriptive tools, attractors “represent the behaviors that flow 
from forces of order and disorder that might exist within a system...” (Ruhl 1996a, 1440 
emphasis added).  In the understanding of the observer attractors can be used to characterise 
particular forces acting upon a system, (Ruhl and Ruhl 1997, 423-424) but this is contestable.  
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Attractors are best used as a descriptive device around which to build an explanation for why 
certain developments occur over time.  What is characterised as an attractor is a decision for 
the observer.  Therefore, the existence and location of attractors is contestable.  This decision 




Complex systems are adaptive.  They have a capacity to learn and remember which 
manifests internally in the form of self-organisation, at the boundary as models which help a 
system to understand its environment and respond to stimuli, and in the environment which 
also changes in response to the interplay of its component parts.  Complex systems evolve 
with reference to their environment (Kauffmann 1993).  The system, acting under “internal 
and external forces” (Lewin 1992, 149), reacts to changes in its environment by continuously 
re-self-organising in the light of feedback on its interactions from the environment 
(information) (Waldrop 1994, 179).  All systems co-evolve with one another and the 
environment making it difficult to deliberately cause and predict the consequences of 
environmental change (Ruhl 2008, 903).  Biologists term this kind of competitive, co-
evolving behaviour between systems the “Red Queen Phenomenon” (van Valen 1973; 
concept used in Ruhl and Salzman 2003, see particularly 784-785).  Attempts by humanity to 
direct a complex social system are likely to be unsuccessful because the “space of 
possibilities is too vast” and humans possess “no practical way of finding the optimum” 
(Waldrop 1994, 147).  The absence of centralised control and the distributed nature of 




The internal conflicts of a system generated by the contingency and locality of 
knowledge are interactions which create higher level regularities.  As each system participant 
implements their own contingent vision of adaptation to the environment this feeds upwards 
to create the higher- (eventually meta-) level regularities which are the system’s behaviour as 
a whole.  However, systems will not always adapt correctly (Ruhl 1996a, 1412); their 
emergent responses to environmental stimuli are based on imperfect contingent local 
knowledge.  In order for the legal system to remain relevant its laws, and legal theories 
concerning those laws, must adapt to wider social change; however, the change that is made 
to a law or theory (a theory as a model) may prove a maladaptation.  For example, a poorly 
adapted rule might appear irrelevant, overly rigid, too flexible, inaccurate, or disjointed, to 
those to whom the rule applies.  Unsuccessful adaptation could result in inobservance or 
misapplication to overcome the perceived problem.  This behaviour is liable to cause either a 
form of disorder through misapplication or non-observation, or stagnation whereby the rules 
are forgotten, neither being misapplied or acknowledged but going unobserved.  However, a 
poorly adapted rule will continue to change because no part of a complex system is ever 
entirely static, though it might be extremely stable.  Similarly a maladapted theory, which 
posits a model through which an individual or the system attempts to understand information, 
will result in the individual or system misunderstanding information, leading to 
misapplication and/or misinterpretation.   
Complex evolution cannot be confused with traditional Darwinian ideas which equate 
evolution with an inexorable progress towards perfection.  Perfection (the optimum), if it is 
possible to attain, is transient, and contingent; beauty being in the eyes of the beholder.  
Complex evolution is simply a change resulting from an environmental stimulus, it is not 
necessarily the correct development, and it is most definitely not progress.  The idea that 
evolution involves progress and betterment misconstrues the concept (see Castellani et al. 
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2009, 23; Cilliers et al. 2007, 120).  System participants make choices all the time, closing 
off the road not taken (in autopoiesis see King 2006, 41), and systems can become locked 
onto a particular path of development, capable of making only incremental changes and 
requiring a massive environmental upset to trigger any significant alteration.  By becoming 
locked onto a certain track of behaviour, elements of the system come to depend on it for 
their existence; this is path-dependency (on the difficulties of legal lock-in see Hathaway, 
2001).  In this way, complex systems adaptability can be constrained by their past choices.  
System history is an aspect of system context.  However, due to nonlinearity it is possible for 
unexpected and significant changes to supersede the effects of path-dependency. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The reading offered here, drawing primarily on the work of Cilliers, shows 
recognisable links to the work of Ruhl, Webb and Murray.  Indeed, the theories each share in 
the notion of anti-reductionism, adaptability, learning, memory, irreversibility, and emergent 
self-organisation.  This suggests that whilst there may be varied tools in complexity theory 
thinking in law, there are certain characteristics which one would expect to find in any 
reading of legal complexity.  The version of complexity offered here is not the only one 
available in law, and alternative versions have been noted.  The varied scope of these 
different interpretations demonstrates that debate will continue as to what a theory of legal 
complexity should contain.  In this way it is necessary to read this contribution in the light of 
the relatively contained wider debate on this question.  It is also important to consider 
complexity theory’s relationship to other systems theories in law to consider the criticisms 
which have been made and to actively distinguish complexity from them. 
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As to the limited deployment of complexity in law so far, this most likely due to a 
lack of awareness as to its meaning and utility.  It would therefore be inappropriate to dismiss 
it out of hand as incapable of challenging the established systems theory of autopoiesis.  
There are a number of parallels and similarities to be drawn between complexity and 
autopoiesis, and this suggests that some conceptual cross-pollination may be possible.  In this 
way, Webb’s article, which implicitly overlaps complexity and autopoiesis, may represent a 
first step (see particularly 2005, 229-234).  It is likely that any such move would meet with 
opposition, not least because autopoiesis is often portrayed as the systems theory of law and 
social systems.  However, while autopoiesis has often faced criticism from non-systems 
perspectives it has rarely been subject to a systems critique (however see Ruhl 1996b, 901-
906 and notes 146-156).  Such a critique would be capable of offering a new perspective on 
autopoiesis.  
I have sought to outline a perspective on the novel theory of legal complexity 
primarily as a means of raising awareness and encouraging engagement.  As such, this piece 
is best characterised as a trace; both in the sense of outlining initial thoughts and in marking 
the contours of the present debate.  Contradictions, paradoxes, and questions have emerged, 
both within this piece and elsewhere, which I have not sought to answer yet.  It is almost 
certain that, in the further exploration of these ideas, there will be a need to alter the very 
general outline offered here.  Certainly the construction presented is based on a contingent 
reading of Cilliers’ perspective which could be contested.  Complexity is a limited theory of 
explanation which recognises the boundaries of our explanatory capacity.  For law it offers 
explanations about the difficulties of managing legal regulation and, more generally, the 
development of legal systems. 
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